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The Public Lands and the National Heritage
Charles F. Wilkinson*
The fundamental question in public land law and policy always has been, and
always will be as long as we have them, whether the federal lands ought to remain in
United States ownership. For nearly the whole of the nation's first century, we were
clear about the answer. The lands and their many resources could best serve the
national interest through their transfer. In addition to providing a modest but steady
flow of needed income, land transfers could unite the country geographically, both
as a magnet for westward-yearning homesteaders and as a reward to the rail
companies that would bind the coasts. A bountiful inducement was, we should
remember, surely needed: Lincoln's dream in 1862 of a transcontinental rail line was
no less daunting than Kennedy's, a century later, of a moon landing. Lincoln knew,
too, how the free national gold and silver from the fields in California, Nevada, and
elsewhere had made the United States a world economic force. The Great Barbeque
of the nineteenth century might have been a national giveaway, but it was also a
national investment.
Our premises began to expand when Hayden's report, Jackson's photographs,
and Moran's paintings made their way back east, verifying every last word Jim
Bridger had said. We quickly set aside the magical high plateau at Yellowstone with
its geysers and its habitat. No nation had ever done such a thing before, yet for a
generation Yellowstone was an isolated act: the truer reflection of our view toward
the national lands in 1872 was the passage of the General Mining Law.
Then, in 1890, with John Muir's fervid pleading making a movement out of
scattered drawing-room conversations, Congress declared a national park, the
world's second, in the Sierra. Just a year later, presidents began employing a
miscellaneous congressional rider as an extraordinary lever for conservation of
forests and watersheds. By the time Roosevelt and Pinchot were finished, in
1907, nearly ten percent of the whole country had been withdrawn from transfer
and put under aggressive federal management as national forests.
On one level, the parks movement—and the related wildlife refuge initiative
sparked by Roosevelt—headed off in a different direction than the more utilitarian
national forests. It certainly seemed that way to Muir. But on another, ultimately
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deeper level, the parks, forests, refuges, and by 1934, the public domain lands, all
worked on exactly the same premise: the nation ought to hold large blocks of land.
Of course, the fact that we have a national land estate owes plenty to serendipity
and accident. In the case of the public domain lands, private default played a greater
role than public decision. And the national park idea started out as a state park idea
and might have stayed that way. Congress' first park, after all, was a state park, created
in 1864 when the national legislature gave Yosemite Valley to California.
But we continue to have a public land system today for reasons as well as
vagaries. The justifications have been tested many times, as recently as the
1940s and the late 1970s, but those efforts were rejected because in the last
analysis the arguments for a sell-off seemed preposterous to the people. The
fact that today we have another debate over public-land ownership doesn't
diminish the idea. We are still debating due process and civil rights also. Each
new generation has to reaffirm our nation's core ideals and, in a democracy,
reaffirmation usually blooms from the loam of a good, vigorous fight.
I'd like to make it clear what I am not fighting about. Public land policy needs
reform. We need to involve local citizens and governments better by working more
extensively and collaboratively in formulating public lands decisions. Although we
can't always spare so much of our top officials' time, the consensus efforts of Betsy
Rieke at the Bay-Delta and Bruce Babbitt with the Colorado grazing meetings, not
top-down directions, are the right approach. Local people have knowledge,
expertise, and a lot at stake. The federal agencies are fraught with inefficiencies and
bad incentives. Private landowners need more certainty when they sign off on an
endangered species plan. In these and other areas, changes ought to be
fundamental, not cosmetic. A rough working model, the framework for the Babbitt
and Rieke efforts, might be substantial federal standards implemented through
deep community participation and tailored to reflect local conditions.
But give away or sell off the public lands in this generation's fight? Not on
your life. We'd lose far too much: too much openness, too much freedom, too
much protection against the thunder heads that lie thick above our children's
heads, and the even darker ones that lie above our grandchildren's.
I don't trust the bills that we're seeing pushed so hard. You can learn
about a bill from its text but you find out even more from the people who are
pushing it. By and large, the pressure is not coming from the stickers—the
ranchers who have made up their minds to protect the riparian zones, the family
timber operations who are grooming the stands for their grandchildren, the
local miners who are determined to protect the streams from erosion and acid
mine drainage, or the business people who know that the big sky and the open
terrain are their communities' best assets.
The stickers take the long view, more so now than ever. That doesn't mean they
aren't mad. Many of them are, and some have signed up with the Wise Use
Movement. But they want reform, not demolition. They know that most family ranches
can't outbid the subdividers for the valley floors, that the streams and the elk herds
may not remain open to the public, and that the odds go way up for pits and slashes
on the ridges above town that go from summer green to autumn gold to winter silver.
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However you characterize their motives, the people behind these bills favor
sharply increased extraction. They claim to be for efficiency and they are—a sharpedged, straight-ahead, short-term efficiency, a sword's thrust. There is precious
little concern for community stability, for the environment, or for social equity.
Take the notable omission of Indian tribal governments from the reform
proposals. Remember that these are supposedly proposals to "return" the land
to the states as a matter of equity and to allow local governments—close to the
ground, close to the people—to make decisions.
If so, why exclude the tribes? Tribal governments possess one of the three
sources of sovereignty, along with the United States and the states, in our
constitutional framework. There can be, of course, no "return" of public lands to the
states, which never owned them. But the tribes did own them, as a matter of historical
fact and American real property law. In aboriginal times, before the treaties, they
owned all of it in a shared estate with the federal government. Chief Justice Marshall
made that clear in 1823 in Johnson v. McIntosh. The tribes ceded much of that aboriginal
land to the United States, but reserved large holdings in the treaties and other
transactions. Most of the treaty land—theirs forever, so we said—was then taken by
various devices ranging from wars to land rushes to fine print. In all, the treaty land, fee
simple land, probably amounted to 200 million acres, more than the national forest
system. Indian land holdings today total about 55 million acres.
Ask the Klamaths about their lost treaty reservation, once 1.1 million acres
that until 1961 ran from just north of Klamath Falls nearly all the way to Chemult,
more than sixty miles: ponderosa pine country, some of the best there is; Klamath
Marsh, where tribal members hunted for duck and otter and gathered the wocus
plant; the Sycan and Williamson Rivers, spring-fed streams full of food; open
meadows where the Interstate Deer Herd wintered. Ask the Sioux about the Black
Hills, the Sun Dance places, the vision quest sites, the deer, and the quarter of a
billion dollars held today in a federal trust account that the Sioux Nation staunchly
refuses to accept as payment for the old land. Ask the Utes of Colorado about the
solemn treaty of 1868 that Ouray and Nicagaat so carefully negotiated and that
reserved to the tribe twenty percent of Colorado, most of the Western Slope; about
how the whole San Juan range was torn off in 1874 in the name of gold; and about
how the reservation was obliterated in 1880 after what we once dared to call the
Meeker Massacre but now have begun to understand was the Battle of Milk Creek, a
clash between two governments across a canyon of cultural differences. Ask the
Santa Clara, Sandia, and the other New Mexico pueblos about the corrupt Pueblo
Lands Act of 1924 and the land that should still be theirs.
Are these land-transfer bills really about history or equity or local government?
It may be useful to look at the individual public land systems to see some
of the reasons we have a national land estate and how we would wound the
people and our future by selling those lands to the states, the companies, or the
companies via the states.
The national parks, as surely as the Statue of Liberty or the Stars and
Stripes, stand for what we believe in as a people, as a national society. The
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national park idea is one of our country's best cultural inventions, now
emulated the world over.
The high, jagged, lonesome granite that helped cut out myths and our
character is on grand display in many of them. You know their names, names for
all time. The deepest canyon holds more exposed geology than anywhere else. It
is the world's university of geology. The earth's finest remaining geyser fields—
almost all of the others have been drawn down—lie beneath the lodgepole pine
stands in the Northern Rockies. The millennia of our deep human history, and
our growing appreciation of it, is honored in the park near the Four Corners.
The Hansen bill would just study the parks for closure. Its proponents
express surprise, shock, at the idea that the great parks would be sold off. But
then, we should ask, why study the whole system for closure? Of course, there
are a handful of parks that don't speak to our national heritage, that don't
inspire our pride and wonder. Such a study of those few and small parks, with
recommendations to Congress, can be done administratively, with little time or
money. But don't indulge the subtext of this bill, which is a raid on our dowry of
history, science, refuge, and inspiration.
I imagine that everyone who cares about the public lands is a critic of the
Forest Service. I know I am. The agency has all manner of faults: it extracts too
much, it extracts too little, it moves too fast, it moves too slow, it is too distant,
it is too co-opted by locals. Yet where else in this county, where on earth, is a
large land base run so well for so many competing purposes?
With all its warts, the Forest Service has a tradition of excellence rare in
public offices. Pinchot's views, because they are so formidable, are debated yet
today, but his standards of quality are unimpeachable. The Forest Service still
gets the best young blood out of the natural resources schools. Forest Service
research serves our resources well. A large and diverse land system furthers that
work. The contest in the Pacific Northwest has focused on the national forests
precisely because in spite of the overcutting since the 1960s, the national forests
have been the most conservatively managed lands and hold almost all of the
old growth outside of the national parks.
The national forest system, which Senators Burns and Murkowski want to
study for disposal, well serves us and our future. The forests are the watershed for
the West. The range is in good condition. The national forests are key habitat for
wildlife. It is a fact, not a slap at the states, to say that the states have no institutions
in place comparable to the deeper and more broad-gauged Forest Service. A
number of western states, believing that state trust lands must be dedicated solely
to extractive uses, refuse to allow, or sharply curtail, non-revenue-producing
multiple uses, including recreation. Arizona, New Mexico, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah,
and Montana all lack forest practices acts. In those states that have acted on forest
practices, the statutes fall well short of federal legislation.
The BLM lands and the wildlife refuges have long been undersupported.
The agencies haven't had the time or opportunity to build the personnel or
esprit that characterize the Forest Service. Yet both are rapidly improving offices,
growing more professional each year.
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The Hansen disposal bill would transfer all BLM lands to the states,
without payment. It provides no compensation for the coal under Kaiparowits,
one of the world's premier deposits, or for the fine O&C and Coos Bay Wagon
Road timber lands in western Oregon. Why would someone propose this? Is it
for long-term sustainability? Or would we see a second, quick-draw transfer,
also for a song, but this time to the big private interests?
Is it sensible abruptly to jettison the knowledge and practices that have
built up over the years in the federal land agencies? Granted, while there is
creativity and quality, there is also inefficiency and wrongheadedness. Yes, the
federal agencies have yet finally to learn that they should be citizen convenorscollaborators, not masters. But how many years, if it ever happened at all, would
it take a western state in these budget-tight times to build a comparable ability
to manage tens of millions of new acres?
And then there is wilderness, which we have managed to preserve only as
a whole nation. Now, we learn, even the BLM lands have wondrous wild back
country.
Kaiparowits, the interior of the Colorado Plateau, itself the interior of the
nation, is not just for coal. Few people come to this southern Utah plateau
because modern conveniences are so distant, traditional beauty so scarce,
normal recreational opportunities so limited. Precipitation measures ten to
twelve inches a year. There are just two or three perennial streams, and they
carry little water. One dirt road, usable by passenger cars, runs up to Escalante.
Otherwise, it is all jeep trails. Pinon-juniper stands offer almost no cover from
the sun. Cross-country backpacking is for experts only. You have to scour the
topographic maps, plan your trip with care (being sure to hit the springs), and
stick to your plan. Even a short hike is a challenge. From a distance, Kaiparowits
looks flat on top but in fact, it is up-and-down, chopped-up, confusing. You can
get lost, snakebite, or otherwise injured. There's no one to call.
Kaiparowits is, in a word, wild—"wilderness," as Raymond Wheeler put it,
"right down to its burning core." Eagles, hawks, and peregrines are in there,
especially in the wind currents near the cliffs, and so are bighorn sheep, trophy
elk, and deer. Archaeologists have recorded some 400 sites but there are many
more. There has been little surveying, except near some of the mine sites. From
Kaiparowits you are given startling Plateau vistas in all directions: vivid view of
more than 200 miles if the winds have cleared out the haze; views as
encompassing as those from the southern tip of Cedar Mesa, the east flank of
Boulder Mountain, the high LeSals, Dead Horse Point; long, stretching expanses
of sacred county. If you climb the rocky promontories on top of Kaiparowits you
can see off to Boulder Mountain, the Henrys, Black Mesa, Navajo Mountain, the
Kaibab Plateau, the Vermilion Cliffs.
The languid stillness of Kaiparowits turns your mind gently and slowly to
wondering about time, to trying to comprehend the long, deep time all of this took,
from Cretaceous, from back before Cretaceous, and to comprehend, since Lake Powell
and the seventy-story stacks of Navajo Generating Station also now play part of the
vista, how it is that our culture has so much might and how it is that we choose to
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exert it so frantically, with so little regard of the time that you can see, actually see,
from here. Perhaps somehow by taking some moments now, here in this stark pinonjuniper rockland place, here in this farthest-away place, a person can nurture some of
the fibers of constancy and constraint that our people possess in addition to the
might. The silence is stunning, the solitude deep and textured.
Kaiparowits makes you decide on the value of wildness and remoteness.
Kaiparowits is where the dreams for the West collide. Coal, jobs, growth. Long
vistas, places to get lost in, places to find yourself in.
The BLM wild lands teach us, also, about the people who once lived and
worked and loved and worshipped for such a long time in what has been called
BLM land for such a short time.
Last year, my son Seth, then twenty, and I took a long, home-from-college
trip to the canyon country. We hiked most of one day up to our calves in a creek
that over the course of some seven million years has cut a thousand feet down
through the fiery, aeolian Wingate Sandstone and the layers of rock above it.
In a rare wide spot in the canyon, behind a cluster of junipers, we found a panel
of pictographs on the Wingate. The artisan painted this row of red and white images—
supernatural and life-size—two thousand years ago, perhaps more. The three stolid
figures had wide shoulders, narrow waists. We could see straight through the round
staring eyes, and the eyes could see through us. We called it "Dream Panel."
It would be so contemptuous of time to deal away Kaiparowits and Dream
Panel. Perhaps the states would protect these and other wild places of national
worth as well as they are protected now. But do we want to risk it?
The debate over holding the public lands is magnified in these times. Today,
far more so than during the 1940s or even the 1970s, the pressures on the lands and
communities are different and greater, the reasons for retention more and stronger.
And the difference between now and then is one of kind, not just scale.
For a century and a half, the American West has hitched its destiny to
rapid population growth. And most people would agree that wide-open
boosterism had its place and time. The West, after all, was the nation's last
place to be settled, and civic infrastructures—whole economies, really—had to
be built out of rock, sand, and stingy rivers.
But now, for the first time in history, westerners are directly questioning
growth—its high price tag and the way it is remaking communities and the land
itself. You hear these concerns all across the region, from Denver to Reno and
from Phoenix to Seattle. You hear them, too, in the cattle, farm, and tourist towns.
It is no wonder. In just two generations, since World War II, the West has
industrialized and urbanized in a way perhaps unparalleled in world history.
Contrary to the popular impression, the key period for settling the West was not
the westward expansion of the nineteenth century. The most recent era, the one
we are still in, has become the decisive time for peopling the region.
It has come on so fast. Civic leaders had always wanted much, much more
population and wealth, and beginning in 1945 they got it. The Cold War was a
bonanza for the West, which had the open land required for military
installations. The soil, when irrigated, could grow any crop from alfalfa to
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pecans. The land was magnificent, perfect for locating subdivisions and
companies.
Perfect also were the post-War politics. Washington, D.C. picked up the
bill, building the military installations, subsidizing water projects, and
underwriting the interstate highways. Federal largesse carried few strings: there
was minimal oversight of health, environmental, or budgetary matters.
In 1945 the West's population stood at 15 million. Today it is 56 million. The
Southwest has been transformed from a backwater of 8 million people to a
powerhouse of 30 million today. Nearly all of the growth has come in the cities. The
Denver area has boomed from 475,000 to 2.1 million. Phoenix, a dirt-road
settlement of 5,500 people in 1900, grew to a metropolitan area of 250,000 by 1945.
Today the Valley of the Sun is pushing 2.5 million. Las Vegas could not even qualify
for the census, which required 2,500 people, until 1930. At the end of the War, the
Las Vegas areas had about 40,000 people. This year it reached 1 million.
The benefits—economic, civic, and cultural—have been many; but they
seemed mostly unalloyed in 1975. Since then, the costs of explosive growth and
consumption have become ever more evident.
Our sense of society has been stressed and torn. Overcrowded schools.
Soaring health bills. Dangerous, sometimes deadly, streets. More prisons to build.
Smog, traffic congestion, and industrial pollution. Bursting federal, state, and
municipal budgets. All of these are growth-caused or growth related. So is the
increase in loss of life and property from natural disasters. We are building too close
to the fault lines, rivers, and tinder-dry forests, and we are paying the price.
Though the population is urban, the post-War boom has taken a heavy toll on
the rural West. The resources couldn't come from the cities themselves. They had
already exhausted their own water supplies. Coal-fired power plants near the cities
would make the smog—a word invented in post-War Los Angeles—even worse.
So the cities reached into the public and Indian lands of the interior West.
For the southwestern urban areas, the main target was the Colorado Plateau,
the Four Corners Area, the spectacular redrock canyon country, home to the
nation's most traditional Indian people. The Plateau's deep canyons would
make superb reservoirs. The ages had laid down some of the best coal, oil, gas,
and uranium deposits on earth.
Almost before anyone knew it, the Colorado Plateau was laced with dams
and reservoirs up to 200 miles long, power plants with stacks 70 stories tall, 500and 345-KV power lines spanning hundreds of miles, and uranium operations
that required mining, milling, and, almost as an afterthought, waste disposal.
In all, this big build-up of the Colorado Plateau—its heyday ran from 1955
through 1975—was one of the most prodigious peacetime exercises of
industrial might in human history. Among the few competitors was the furious
build-up of hydroelectric and nuclear energy in the Columbia River Basin, also
in the post-War era. On the Plateau we mourn the loss of mystical canyons,
fabulous archaeological sites, and 200-mile vistas; on the Columbia we grieve
for once-free rivers and the quick, strong, silvery Pacific salmon.

505

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

We also face an intangible cost: we are losing the West, both the slow
moving, uncluttered way of life and the spirituality that lies thick and sweet over
every river, every high divide, every big expanse of open sagebrush range.
We have not yet lost the West. But a question now looms over the land:
Suppose we do for the next 50 years, or even the next 25, what we have done
sine World War II? If we do that, will we still have the West?
Coming to grips with population growth and consumption and achieving
sustainability is almost incomprehensibly difficult. We must operate on all levels,
from conserving and recycling at home, to local and state planning, to global
population. There are staggering problems of economics, technology, and social
equity. It will take decades of diverse and diffuse strategies, and a fundamental shift
in our ethics so that we will voluntarily stabilize population, to reach an equilibrium.
But mark it down, too, that westerners now have actively begun the
discussion about the scale of this unprecedented growth and about how, almost
incredibly, it continues apace. That discussion is the first step: discussion
breeds civic resolve, which in turn spurs action.
In that setting, what better buffer, what better storehouse, what better
endowment, could there be than the fact of the public lands? Where else can we
find the kind of wide-open space we cherish so, that so defines the West, its
history, and its possibilities? What better hope is there for healthy lands and
waters? Are we not singularly blessed in these times by the blend of vagary,
courage, and blinding insight that has left us this estate?
So the public lands are inexorably tied to the future of the West, just as they
have been bonded with its past. With all the imperfections, the American public lands
constitute our planet's best laboratory for sustainability, broadly writ. Our every
experience and intuition ought to tell us we must not jeopardize that future by a
transfer of the federal lands. Their sale directly raises another specter: we may lose the
West. And that would be a loss for us, but a far greater one for our grandchildren, and
those beyond them, faceless but real people who would be left to wonder why their
ancestors once so freely and easily called the American West a sacred place.
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